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Policy Implications of Procuring Components from Foreign Sources for Use in US
Military Weapon Systems1
Guy J. Fritchman
Executive Summary
The inclusion of numerous foreign components and technologies in a wide range of US military weapon
systems, a surprising fact to many, has become the focus of increasing scrutiny.  Aircraft, tanks, ships,
missiles, satellites, and communications equipment operated by the US armed forces all contain components
purchased overseas.  Procuring foreign components for use in military systems is, in several respects,
beneficial—it takes advantage of the world’s best technology, prices, and quality.  In addition, foreign
procurement fosters cooperative international networks.
At the same time, however, foreign procurement potentially renders the United States vulnerable to its
suppliers—mostly US allies—who could cut off or delay delivery of components in pursuit of their own
national interests.  While the United States has never been harmed by such vulnerabilities, it encountered several
“close calls” during the recent Persian Gulf War—if news accounts are correct.  In addition, the United States has
in the past exploited similar vulnerabilities in dealing with its allies.
Compounding vulnerability is a lack of knowledge about the true extent of foreign procurement.  This lack
of knowledge is the result of incomplete data collection.  A dwindling manufacturing base within the United
States also increases the likelihood that foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities are perpetuated.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is a relatively insignificant buyer within the overall US manufacturing base
and cannot, on its own, implement effective policies for reversing this trend.  The strategic indifference of a free
market economy, coupled with inconsistent policies and uncoordinated agencies within the US government,
further perpetuates this trend.
The policy implications of such pervasive and beneficial, but risky, foreign procurements are multifaceted.
One benefit—access to the world’s best technologies for incorporation into technically-superior weapon
systems—is an essential element of US military strategy.  For strategic military reasons then, policy makers
should not limit procurement to domestic sources.
Instead, policy should focus upon taking advantage of this essential benefit of foreign procurement, while at
the same time mitigating factors that make the United States vulnerable.  To preclude “planning in the dark,”
the United States must obtain greater knowledge of the extent to which foreign components are used in its
weapon systems.  An expanded database containing information about components procured at all levels of the
supplier network is essential to determine where vulnerability is greatest.  Once identified, risks can be mitigated
by proliferating suppliers and establishing stockpiles of critical components.
To minimize the likelihood that vulnerabilities associated with foreign procurement might someday become
unmanageable, policy making must also focus upon reversing the decline of the US industrial base.  Future
military capabilities are dependent upon having competitive domestic industries that produce the components
DOD needs for its weapon systems.  The US government should identify critical industries and then invest
government funds in them to enhance future productivity.  Strategic industrial planning, including review and
revision of existing policies that negatively impact industry, is also necessary.
A viable plan for enhancing US industry and mitigating the vulnerabilities presented by foreign
procurements requires more than just DOD; it requires “jointness”—close cooperation and coordination between
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government and industry.  A single, joint organization including representatives from several executive branch
agencies, along with liaisons from Congress and the commercial manufacturing sector, would be a useful
mechanism for setting industrial priorities and establishing reasonable compromises, currently non-existent,
within the US government.  Under the leadership of an individual with clear and broad Presidential authority, a
joint organization would focus policies concerning industrial affairs and future foreign procurement toward US
national interests.  In this manner US policy could become more responsive to trends and needs demonstrated by
the current pervasive procurement of foreign components for use in US weapons systems.
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Introduction
The inclusion of numerous foreign components and technologies in a wide range of US military weapon
systems, a surprising fact to many, has become the focus of increasing scrutiny.  Aircraft, tanks, ships,
missiles, satellites, and communications equipment operated by the US armed forces all contain components
purchased overseas.  Procuring foreign components for use in military systems is, in several respects,
beneficial—it takes advantage of the world’s best technology, prices, and quality.  In addition, foreign
procurement fosters cooperative international networks.
At the same time, however, foreign procurement potentially renders the United States vulnerable to its
suppliers—mostly US allies—who could cut off or delay delivery of components in pursuit of their own
national interests.  While the United States has never been harmed by such vulnerabilities, it encountered several
“close calls” during the recent Persian Gulf War—if news accounts are correct.  In addition, the United States has
in the past exploited similar vulnerabilities in dealing with its allies.
Compounding vulnerability is a lack of knowledge about the true extent of foreign procurement.  This lack
of knowledge is the result of incomplete data collection.  A dwindling manufacturing base within the United
States also increases the likelihood that foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities are perpetuated.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is a relatively insignificant buyer within the overall US manufacturing base
and cannot, on its own, implement effective policies for reversing this trend.  The strategic indifference of a free
market economy, coupled with inconsistent policies and uncoordinated agencies within the US government,
further perpetuates this trend.
This paper examines the policy implications of such pervasive and beneficial, but risky, foreign
procurement practices.  The analysis attempts to ascertain whether the risks of foreign procurement outweigh its
benefits.  Ultimately, the paper recommends policies that would be responsive to current trends and needs.
Pervasive Nature of Foreign Procurement
Procuring components from foreign sources for use within the DOD is a relatively recent phenomena.  Few, if
any, weapon systems in the military forces of the United States during the mid-1970s contained foreign
components.  During the past fifteen years, however, procurement from foreign sources has accelerated rapidly.
According to a recent study at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the percentage of import
penetration increased in 104 out of 122 critical defense sectors during the 1980s.  In the components and
subassemblies sector, import penetration had reached 19 percent by the end of the decade.2
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2The overwhelming presence of foreign components in US weapon systems is documented in existing
studies and literature.  A sampling of citations demonstrates this phenomena:
• The US defense industry is now heavily, if not totally, dependent on foreign sources for computer
memory chips, silicon for high-powered electronic switching, gallium arsenide-based semiconductors
for high-speed data processing, precision glass for reconnaissance satellites and other military
equipment, liquid crystal and luminous displays, and advanced fiber optics.3
• Semiconductors from foreign sources are contained in Global Positioning Satellites, the
Integrated Underwater Surveillance System, Defense Satellite Communications System, Fleet Satellite
Communications System, AN-53B SSQ Sonobuoy, the F-16 Fighting Falcon, AM-6988 Poet Decoy
(an expendable jammer), the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (OH-58 Kiowa), APG-63
Airborne Radar (for the F-15 Eagle), M1 Abrams Tank, and the F/A-18 Hornet.4
• A recent article in the Chicago Tribune reported that Japanese-made technologies are in “night
viewing equipment, air speed acceleration indicators, infrared missile homing devices, television tubes
in aircraft cockpits, microwave weapons control and targeting systems, flat panel displays, advanced
radiation communications equipment, submarine sensors, and video display terminals.”5
• In perhaps the most extensive study ever accomplished on procurement of foreign components,
researchers found numerous specific instances of using overseas sources for US precision guided
missiles (PGMs) in 1987.  Integrated circuit parts for all PGMs were assembled in East Asia.  Radar
components in PGMs were found to contain silicon field effect transistors (FETs) and gallium arsenide
FETs from Japan, ferrite cores from Germany, and radome chemicals from Mexico.  Rocket motor
cases for the Skipper, HARM, and Harpoon missiles were obtained through sources in the United
Kingdom (and Australia in the case of the Harpoon).  The United Kingdom also provided copper-based
printed-wiring board plating bath, actuator motors, and gear motors for the HARM.  It also produced
ball screws for the Patriot.  Australia provided extrusions for the Harpoon.  Switzerland produced
copper preform for the Copperhead missile, and sapphire for the Standard, Patriot, Maverick, and
Sidewinder missiles.  Butan triol (used in making rocket fuel mixtures) for the Standard, Patriot,
Maverick, and Sidewinder came from Germany.  The HARM, Sidewinder, and Maverick missiles
contained precision optics also procured from Germany, as well as Japan.  Castings for the Standard
missile and the launch tube for the Stinger missile were produced in Israel.  Finally, the study found
that molybdenum foil for the Patriot came from Austria.6
• The American Gear Manufacturers’ Association estimated 30 percent of defense contracts for gears
are awarded to foreign sources.  Over twenty-four ships built between 1983 and 1989 were equipped
with gear drives from German or British companies.  Significant portions of aircraft gearing are
provided by Japanese and North European sources.  Vehicular gearing comes increasingly from the
Asian basin and the Mediterranean states.7
• The US Navy purchases spare parts from various European sources:  engine parts for a search and
rescue ship come from Great Britain; Germany supplies diesel engine parts for a patrol coastal missile
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3hydrofoil ship; and hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment for a coastal minesweeper are procured
from Italy.8
• During the Persian Gulf War, several US defense contractors requested “rush” delivery from
foreign companies for components used in military equipment.  Japanese producers of semiconductors,
video display terminals (for analyzing real-time intelligence data from reconnaissance planes), and
battery packs to power command and control computers received such requests.  France provided
transistors for a Teledyne Corporation transponder for Identification of Friend or Foe uses.  In addition,
both France and Japan rushed electronic components for measuring and calibrating equipment.  Finally,
Great Britain surged production of radio gear and avionics for use in US weapon systems.9
The appendix to this essay details further revelations about the extent of foreign components already in US
weapon systems as reported in the literature and in studies examined by this author.  As demonstrated by the
brief listing above, foreign components pervasively constitute both the “critical brain cells,”10 and the essential
mechanical parts of many US weapons.  Today, components procured from foreign sources are “substantially
embedded”11 in weapon systems across the DOD force structure.
This trend toward foreign procurement is continuing.  In April 1991, Groupement Industriel des Armements
Terrestres (GIAT) of France won a contract to supply the gun turrets for the latest US Army light helicopter.12
Great interest has been demonstrated in new Japanese components that have military applications.  A recent
demonstration of the SSMI, a ground-based anti-ship missile developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
reportedly impressed DOD officials.13  The Chicago Tribune also reported that Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney visited Japan in 1990 with a “shopping list” for Japanese equipment and technology:
• Keiko’s advanced missile guidance system (a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile which is claimed
to outperform the Stinger;
• Carbon dioxide lasers to “blind” enemy aircraft and satellites;
• Ceramic engine components for two thousand mile-per-hour aircraft;
• Advanced aircraft wing technology; and
• Third generation tank armor which is incorporated into Japan’s T-90 heavy battle tank and is
claimed to be able to withstand direct hits by most anti-tank weapons currently in use.14
Mechanisms are currently being considered to “rent” or facilitate importation of actual Japanese weapons,
according to Charles H. Ferguson, a postdoctoral research associate at the Center for Technology, Policy, and
Industrial Development at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.15  Such mechanisms are significant
because, in the past, Japanese laws have prohibited export of weapons.  While the United States depends heavily
on Japanese imports for use in its weapon systems, these have been “dual use” items such as semiconductors
and optics components that have both military and commercial applications.  If such obstacles are overcome, it
is likely that the US military, in its pursuit of a force structure technologically superior to all other military
forces, will increase its procurement of Japanese components.
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4Benefits of Foreign Procurement
Greater availability of superior technology is one benefit of procuring foreign components.  As the Office of
Technology Assessment writes, “ .!.!. high technology is a worldwide enterprise.  The United States no longer
has a monopoly on it.”16  In 1989, DOD began publishing listings of critical technologies for its future
weapon systems.  The most recent list contains twenty-one items.17  It has been estimated by various sources
that the United States is no longer dominant in one-quarter to one-half the technologies in this listing.18
By buying abroad, the United States has been able to incorporate the world’s best technologies and
components into its weapon systems.  Numerous US weapon systems containing foreign components
performed admirably during the Gulf War.  Several of these systems are conspicuous in the list contained in the
previous section.
It is essential that the best technologies continue to be incorporated in US weapon systems if the United
States is to maintain its warfighting edge in an economical manner.  For the foreseeable future, it is likely that
wars fought by the United States will be “optional”—fought not to protect home soil, but to rescue
governments or nations under threat, or to respond to aggression in areas of perceived vital interests.19  In such
wars, two strategic concerns for the country are US casualties20 and non-combatant (civilian) casualties of the
enemy.  These strategic concerns necessitate precise and effective offensive action by US armed forces.  Conflict
must be quick, decisive, and to some extent surgical.  Only weapon systems containing the world’s most
superior components and technologies (combined with superior personnel and training) can enable the armed
forces of the United States to fight in this manner.
Continued procurement from sources around the world also maintains US access to technologies that are
available to other nations, including enemies, either on the open market or through clandestine means.21  If an
enemy can purchase or otherwise obtain leading technology higher in quality than that available in the United
States, then there is potential for harm to US military security.  At the least, access to and application of
superior technologies by an enemy would hinder the United States when fighting under those circumstances it is
most likely to encounter over the next several decades.  Thus, access to the best technology is a significant
benefit to procuring components for DOD weapon systems from foreign sources.
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5Besides access to the most advanced technology, procurement from foreign sources brings several other
benefits to DOD and the United States.  Among these are quality control and price.  Martin Libicki, a researcher
in the detailed PGM study mentioned previously, found several instances of contracts awarded to overseas
producers based on “inability of domestic producers to meet required quality control standards, particularly where
material purity matters.”  He cited ferrites, silicon field-effect transistors, and integrated circuit material
packaging as examples where Southeast Asian countries (especially Japan) produced better quality components.
His  study also found some components—gallium arsenide field effect transistors, glass, bearings, and assembly
of integrated circuits, for example—could be purchased significantly cheaper overseas.22
Other studies have also emphasized the price advantages of components obtained through procurement
overseas.  In a study sponsored by the CSIS, project director James Blackwell reported that one US aerospace
contractor pursued significant increases in its foreign supplier base as a means of reducing costs for manufacture
and assembly of a high technology aircraft.  Of thirty two hundred suppliers for its aircraft, the contractor
expanded the foreign supplier base from 194 in 1985 to 263 in 1987 in an effort to promote cost efficiency.23
A US Navy study in the 1980s found that a Spanish company could produce anchor chains significantly cheaper
than the sole US manufacturer.  The navy thus awarded anchor chain contracts to the Spanish company in a
cost-reduction effort, although it also continued limited procurements from the sole US source.24
One additional example further demonstrates the cost/price advantages sometimes obtained from overseas
suppliers.  In some cases, the volume of DOD purchases has been so small that domestic manufacturers have
been unable to attain economies of scale—enough production to be profitable for the manufacturer or cost-
effective for DOD.  As John A. Richards, Director of the Commerce Department’s Office of Industrial Resource
Administration, testified before a House of Representatives subcommittee in 1988:
For example, the United States can produce all types of medium range artillery shells.  Our ultra-
long-range rounds, for which the military has a very low relative requirement, are of older design and no
longer considered state-of-the-art.  Several NATO European rounds have more sophisticated production
capabilities.  The establishment of a US production capability for this limited need, would not only
involve substantial capital costs, but also an extensive and unnecessary R&D investment.
He further stipulates, “ .!.!. the central effect is simple:  it would lead to increased costs of ammunition in a
period of scarce resources.”  In Richard’s mind not only does it make better fiscal sense, but also it enhances
NATO “standardization and interoperability” when DOD procures the “ultra-long-range” artillery shells from
European allies.25
In alluding to enhancement of NATO “standardization and interoperability” during his 1988 testimony, Mr.
Richards introduced a final important benefit of procuring weapons components from overseas—a spirit of
international cooperation.  A report published by the Air Force Association and the United States Naval Institute
Military Database the same year expounds:  “This nation does not envision a single-handed defense of either the
European or Pacific theaters of operation.  In any such conflict, it is committed to fighting alongside its allies.
A reasonable degree of interdependence and interoperability is logical under those circumstances.”26
Thus, procurement from foreign sources “clearly plays a strategic role in establishing [or enhancing] ties
between the United States and other countries.”27  Pursuant to its strategic interests, the United States has
negotiated a series of nineteen bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with foreign governments
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6establishing reciprocity in defense procurement matters.28  With each MOU, “the US strategy of ‘coalition
defense’ has been backed up by ‘coalition research, development, production, procurement, and follow-on
support,’ according to James M. Compton, [then] acting undersecretary of defense for industrial and international
programs.”29
In a broad sense, such interdependence “tends to strengthen the alliance itself because it raises the costs for
an ally that would choose to withdraw from the alliance.”30  More narrowly, this cooperation helps nations
within NATO avoid “procurements which re-invent the wheel.”  The United States, for instance, evaluated
thirty-two foreign items (mostly European) in 1989 for this purpose.31
Even more specifically, previously established cooperative mechanisms between the United States and its
allies enabled quick procurement during the mobilization period prior to the Gulf War.  Several examples have
already been mentioned concerning rushed component procurement for accelerating or “surging” production of
weapon systems.  These cooperative networks also enabled immediate bolstering of US capabilities in the Gulf
by using foreign sources to work around known US weaknesses while preparing for war.  Foreign-flagged
vessels were chartered to transport equipment to the Gulf as part of the massive sealift and mobilization effort.
More than half of the ships (175 out of 330) used in this effort were foreign-flagged.32
Several other examples were reported throughout the Gulf crisis and war.  Though never used during the
war, purchase of two dozen “Have Nap” missiles from Israel would have enabled B-52 bombers to perform in a
standoff role using conventional munitions.33  Sixty “Fuchs” tanks were also procured from Germany to enable
early and remote sensing of the initiation of chemical warfare by the Iraqis.  In addition, the United States
obtained more than one thousand other vehicles from Germany as part of its “burden sharing” effort.  Many of
these vehicles, in fact, had been part of the East German military force structure prior to the unification and had
been manufactured in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or the Soviet Union!  Examples of vehicles obtained from
Germany included:  Mercedes military ambulances, five-ton trucks, fuel tankers, water tankers, Soviet-made Ural
trucks, construction equipment, loading and off-loading vehicles, and heavy-duty Czech-made transporters for
pulling tanks.34  These tank transporters (approximately two hundred) played an especially important part in the
fast-paced flanking movement that outsmarted the Iraqis at the beginning of the ground war in February 1991.35
Thus, a cooperative, interdependent network with its allies certainly paid off for the United States during the
Gulf crisis.
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7Vulnerability:  Cause for Concern
Though beneficial in many respects, procuring from foreign sources has its detrimental aspects too.  There is
cause for concern that foreign procurement entails significant risk.  Every time the United States uses a foreign
component in one of its weapon systems, it exposes itself to potential vulnerability—supply cutoff, delay of
delivery, and foreign interference in its affairs.
Vulnerability is undeniably a consequence of procuring foreign components for use in DOD weapon
systems.  In simple terms, vulnerability is the inability of a nation to obtain what is needed for its military
forces on a timely basis.36  Whenever DOD procures components, even from domestic sources, there is risk that
a supplier will default on its obligations.  The risk, however, increases when the supplier is based in a foreign
nation, not subject to US laws, and moreover, subject to the laws of another government.37
One potential vulnerability is cutoff of components by a supplying nation or manufacturer, especially
during contingency situations.  If the United States cannot obtain components needed to produce a weapon
system, then it either must do without, come up with alternative suppliers, or find suitable substitutes for the
component.  Without preplanning for such a situation, there is potential for a crisis in force capabilities.  For
instance, in the event of complete foreign cutoff, it would take more than one year for domestic sources to
produce the silicon or gallium arsenide field-effect transistors used in high frequency radars common to most
PGMs.38  If the cutoff occurred during war, the United States would quite possibly lack sufficient quantities of
PGMs after initial stockpiles were depleted (somewhere between three and six months after war is initiated,
according to news accounts prior to the Gulf War) until domestic production was enabled.  A cutoff would force
greater utilization of “dumb bombs” and other less-capable military hardware as a substitute for lost capabilities;
under such circumstances the likelihood that US and noncombatant casualties could be kept to a minimum
diminishes greatly.39
To date, the United States has never suffered the consequences of foreign supplier cutoff, either in peacetime
or war, but plausible cutoff scenarios have been speculated.  One potential scenario simply posits disagreement
by the foreign supplier with US policy.  When testifying before a House of Representatives subcommittee,
American Gear Manufacturers’ Association Executive Director Richard B. Norment related the story of the USS
Iowa heading for its battle station in preparation for the US bombing raid on Libya in 1986.  A gear used in the
steering mechanism of the ship, he said, broke on the way to the battle station, causing it to turn “about four
degrees to port out in the middle of the Atlantic, constantly.”  While a replacement gear was found within the
United States, enabling correction in seventy-two hours, Norment speculated that the outcome would have been
different had it been necessary to procure the gear from France, one of the few world suppliers of gears left as the
United States is losing its manufacturing capabilities in this area.  One might recall that France, in opposing
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8US action against Libya, did not allow over flight for US bombers during the raid, and thus there was a
possibility that France also would have denied needed components for US weapon systems.40
Several other potential cutoff scenarios have been offered. Problems such as strikes, political unrest, or
natural disasters within the supplier’s country are all plausible. Cutoffs might also be created by the supplying
nation giving priority to ventures more profitable than DOD contracts, or giving priority to the supplier’s home
country needs over the United States, especially in times of crisis.  Countries external to the supplying country
could also create cutoffs—by threatening the supplier, by an overt blockade, or by war.  One US study done
prior to the end of the Cold War, reminded readers that Japan was within easy bombing distance of the Soviet
Union, and thus the USSR could easily cut off critical components for US weapon systems.41  Although the
political climate for the near term makes this specific scenario unlikely, recent Soviet military activity
demonstrates that the possibility remains.  The USSR test fired two sea-launched ballistic missiles into the Sea
of Japan at a time coinciding with Mikhail Gorbachev’s April 1991 visit to Japan.  Some analysts described the
test firings as a “muscle flex” and a “political message for Tokyo.”42  The message, however, has ramifications
for the United States also—sources of certain critical supplies are vulnerable to hostility, a situation that creates
a possible domino effect on US weapon systems.
Another potential risk is delay in delivery of needed components.  One defense supplier, in fact, claims that
we have already been harmed by this vulnerability to a minor extent.  Cray Research Inc., a Minneapolis-based
firm, leads the world in supercomputer technology, but it is dependent on Japanese suppliers for many high-
speed logic and memory chips.  Jerry Brost, Cray’s vice president for engineering says, “We have seen cases
where we haven’t received the parts [from the overseas suppliers] when we needed them.”43  Although a
problem, the damage to national security was negligible in this peacetime case; it merely hampered Cray’s
ability to deliver its end products in accordance with its contracts.  Such delays, however, could have had
security implications if they had occurred during the Gulf War.
Despite the successes of US military weapon systems that used foreign high technology components during
the Gulf War, there were moments of uncertainty as to whether the United States would be able to get requested
“rush” orders filled for needed components on a timely basis.  Reporter Stuart Auerbach recently reported in the
Washington Post that “on nearly thirty occasions, the Bush administration had to call upon foreign governments
for help to get delivery of crucial parts for the war effort.”  Auerbach continued, “foreign manufacturers often
were reluctant to put the Pentagon’s purchase orders ahead of their regular customers’ without prompting from
their governments, according to officials at embassies here and at the Commerce Department.”44
Of special concern were Japanese suppliers.  According to John Eckhouse, an investigative reporter for the
San Francisco Chronicle, “The Japanese electronics companies—whose identities have not been publicly
disclosed—reportedly said they could not curtail existing commercial contracts, such as orders from VCR,
television, and automobile manufacturers, to meet the needs of the US forces in the Gulf.”  Experts on Japan,
according to Mr. Eckhouse, also speculated that Japanese suppliers, in a society geared toward avoiding any
military involvement beyond national borders in the post-World War II era, “may have been afraid of domestic
political ramifications of favoring military over commercial customers.”  Mr. Eckhouse’s interview with an
unnamed Commerce Department official revealed that the US government “had to ‘jump through the hoops’ and
                                                
40. Testimony, US Congress, House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Defense Production Act Amendments of
1989, HR 486:  Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, 101st Congress, first session, 17, 18, 24 May and 20
June 1989 (Washington, DC:  US Government Printing Office, 1989 , Serial No. 101-27): 16, 17.
41. Demeritt and Renard, “Navy Dependence on Foreign Spares,” 16.
42. Bill Gertz, “Soviets Tested Ballistic Missiles in Sea of Japan,” Washington Times, 1 May 1991: 7.
43. George Leopold, “US Must Avoid Foreign Dependence in Order to Keep Supercomputer Lead,” Defense News (29 January
1990): 34.
44. Auerbach, “US Relied on Foreign-Made Parts for Weapons,” 1.
9that the department took the unusual step of asking Japanese government officials at the embassy in
Washington for help in prodding Japanese suppliers.”45
If Auerbach’s and Eckhouse’s reports are true, then the Gulf War is the first documented case of US
vulnerability to foreign suppliers during a wartime situation.  It is important to note, however, that while the
potential vulnerability was real, the reports also revealed successful resolution of the problems.  Government to
government intervention successfully shifted suppliers’ priorities towards the war effort.  The unnamed
Commerce Department official interviewed by Eckhouse “insisted that it would be an overstatement to call the
incident a crisis. ‘While it is the first time that our growing dependence on certain critical components was
spotlighted in a war setting, we were able to resolve the challenge successfully,’ he said.  ‘We were lucky we
were dealing with allies.’”46
The remarks of this unnamed Commerce Department official deserve some critical analysis.  This official
was correct to emphasize that crisis was averted, since the United States obtained the components needed on a
timely basis.  The potential for crisis, however, certainly existed and only a common political objective shared
by top levels of the US and foreign governments averted more serious problems.  The bond between most
governments during the war was created by nearly-unanimous outrage over Iraq’s aggression; such a bond was
both unprecedented and delicate, thus it may be tough to duplicate in the future.  Had there not been a common
political objective or had the Japanese government, for instance, been more inclined to bow to domestic calls for
avoiding contributions to the war effort (and there was considerable pressure within Japan for noninvolvement),
it is quite likely the United States would have had to look for other sources to obtain necessary components.
Without pre-planning for alternate supply sources, the probability of a favorable resolution would have decreased
significantly.
Furthermore, the mere fact that the US government requested assistance from foreign governments to obtain
rush orders of critical supplies revealed a “weakness in its defense production to outsiders who may not share our
security concerns.”47  The implication here is that foreign governments can use this demonstrated weakness as
leverage in future dealings with the United States—linking US foreign and economic policies that they desire
with continued supply of military components.
An ominous prediction of foreign interference was succinctly detailed by Japanese politician (and long-time
Diet member) Shintaro Ishihara, in The Japan That Can Say No.  After touting Japan’s dominance in
semiconductor manufacturing, Ishihara predicted that the accuracy of guidance systems for both US and Soviet
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be totally dependent in the future on these products of
Japanese manufacturing prowess.  In Ishihara’s words:
In short, without using new-generation computer chips made in Japan, the US Department of
Defense cannot guarantee the precision of its nuclear weapons.  If Japan told Washington it would no
longer sell computer chips to the United States, the Pentagon would be totally helpless.  Furthermore,
the global military balance could be completely upset if Japan decided to sell its computer chips to the
Soviet Union instead of the United States.48
Ishihara may be incorrect in the details of the example he cites, but his point is well-taken.  In fact,
semiconductors for ICBMs are not produced in Japan—they are produced within the United States due to the
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necessity of guaranteeing shielding against radiation and the electro-magnetic pulse,49 something Japanese
manufacturers do not design into their chips.  But because an estimated 90 percent of the semiconductors used
within the US military come from the Far East, especially Japan,50 the United States is becoming quite
vulnerable to Japanese leverage, as Mr. Ishihara implies.
By using their leverage as suppliers for critical components of US weapon systems, Japan or other nations
could hamper the United States in producing or using weapons it deems necessary.  The United States may find
itself making decisions about new weapons based on foreign research and development, foreign parts, and
knowledge that foreigners are willing to share.  Furthermore, the ability of the United States to engage in
sustained war would be dependent on continuous support from foreign suppliers.  If a supplying nation loses
interest in the war, or is convinced that continued supply to the United States is detrimental to its own interests,
availability of future components would be threatened.  In addition, the decision by a foreign country to provide
its best technology might be conditional on a favorable decision by the United States in another area of foreign
or economic policy.51  To date, the United States has yet to encounter such situations, but a recent threat by a
high-ranking Japanese official has ominous overtones about such linkage.  Japan’s minister of finance, Makoto
Utsumi, was reported to have threatened to curb credit to the United States if Congress passed a bill imposing
restrictions on Japanese banks and security firms.  This was the first time that Japan had openly threatened to
use its ownership of American debt to influence American policy.  It does not take a great leap of logic to infer
that Japan could just as easily threaten cutoff of military components in the future.  Ultimately, the issue of
potential foreign interference boils down to a question often-asked in today’s interdependent and competitive
world: “who will set the agenda” for the United States—politically, militarily, and economically?  For the
United States, this is becoming a serious question.
The preceding discussion about crisis and the potential for foreign interference demonstrates that a large part
of this concern is not about nations considered to be US enemies, but, instead, about nations that are allies of
the United States.  Nations that have traditionally been our strongest political allies and sources of
interdependence (members of NATO, Japan, and Canada) have also grown to become our biggest economic
competitors.  Some nations, especially Japan, have shown willingness to use economic clout as leverage
against the United States.
In addition, both the United States and its allies have demonstrated diverging political interests on many
occasions, and each has used whatever leverage it had available to show the other displeasure or to attempt to
persuade the other to change its policy.  The Europeans have, on occasion, shown displeasure with US policies
by refusing landing or overflight rights for US aircraft.  Most European nations refused landing privileges to US
planes involved in supply efforts during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.  The refusal by France to allow overflight
during the 1986 bombing raid of Libya has already been mentioned.  The United States, for its part, has
threatened and actually cut off critical supplies from European allies on several occasions.  One example is the
US threat during the crisis of 1956 to cut off oil supplies to the British and the French if they did not remove
their military forces from the Suez Canal region.  From 1964 to 1966 the United States denied France computer
technology in order to inhibit Charles DeGaulle’s “force de frappe” and to force work on France’s hydrogen
bomb to stop.  Finally, to express displeasure with repressive Soviet policies in Poland in the early 1980s, the
United States retroactively canceled technology licensing agreements with European nations in an attempt to
prevent European help for the construction of the Soviet-European gas pipeline.52
These examples remind one of the often-quoted phrase by Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston (1784-
1865):  “Nations do not have permanent enemies; nor do they have permanent friends.  They have only
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permanent interests.”  After paraphrasing this very thought when he testified about the potential vulnerability of
the United States caused by procurement from allies, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Thomas H. Moorer, USN, added:  “And if we get involved in some kind of altercation or confrontation which is
contrary to the national interest of any of these nations, they will stop production.”53  In this respect the
previously-mentioned unnamed Commerce Department official was incorrect in assessing the avoidance of crisis
during the Gulf War as “lucky we were dealing with allies.”  In fact, we were lucky that we were dealing with
allies that had compatible political objectives.  While procurement from allies doesn’t entail as much risk as it
would from other countries, the fact remains that the risk is considerable.
Compounding Vulnerability
It is apparent that the risk of vulnerability is compounded by other factors.  One factor is a lack of knowledge
about the true extent of foreign sourcing.  This factor precludes well-planned responses to existing
vulnerabilities.  A second factor, the dwindling manufacturing base in the United States, increases the likelihood
that the vulnerabilities of foreign procurement will be perpetuated and probably continue to increase.  Thus,
focusing on reducing existing vulnerabilities is beneficial to some extent, but it is not a long-term solution.
Third, an internally-inconsistent collection of uncoordinated government agencies and disjointed policies,
fostered by free market ideology in the United States, hampers effective management and reduction of these
vulnerabilities.  Each of these factors requires detailed analysis.
While this paper has used numerous examples to depict the pervasive use of foreign components in US
weapon systems, knowledge of its true extent is lacking.  A 1988 Department of Defense (DOD) report stated,
“While this issue has been studied extensively on an ad hoc basis, and anecdotal evidence abounds, there are few,
even moderately comprehensive studies of foreign-sourced components of key weapon systems.”54  The 1989
CSIS study mentioned previously concluded that although the trend towards foreign procurement of microchips
is well-known, “there is reason to be troubled by the lack of adequate data and analysis of other products and
sectors, which may conceal significant vulnerabilities lurking beyond view.”55  In an attempt to foster analysis
and decision making, DOD has been assembling a broad database since 1985.  Named “The Defense Industrial
Network” (DINET), it contains information about the components, suppliers, and manufacturers used to produce
DOD weapon systems procured from 1986 to the present.  DINET has a variety of purposes—among them is to
identify specific components procured from foreign sources and provide information about potential alternative
suppliers.
This database, however, has been widely criticized as not being comprehensive.  Criticism focuses on limits
imposed on data collection.  Data contained within the system includes only items for which DOD made “direct
purchases” (components contracted specifically to DOD), but does not include those purchased by contractors to
DOD.  Purchases tracked do not include contracts of less than $25,000, nor does the database include purchases
“off the shelf”—those purchases made without formal contracting or specification processes.
This means that there is no information within the database about a whole realm of suppliers, either foreign
or domestic, that under subcontract provide components to a prime contractor who, in turn, has a direct purchase
contract with DOD.  In modern weapons systems, prime contractors are merely “system integrators.”  It is not
uncommon for them to subcontract 60 to 70 percent of their overall production work through a network of
manufacturers that could be ten to fifteen tiers deep!56  Thus, any picture obtained from examining the existing
DINET database is incomplete.  Larry Grossman, associate editor of Military Forum, probably summed it best
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when he wrote, “DOD knows which companies are building its tanks, fighter aircraft, and submarines, but it has
less insight into the origin of what is under the hood.  That is because the military does little to monitor the
activities of sub-tier contractors.”57
Without data pertaining to all levels of supply and production of a weapon system, it is likely that many
potential or existing vulnerabilities are unknown.  If such vulnerabilities are exposed by surprise, especially in
time of war, then the potential for crisis exists.  A complete database would enable identification of
vulnerabilities prior to the crisis stage, as well as allow a proactive response.
A second factor compounding vulnerability is the dwindling US manufacturing base.58  CSIS reported that
the number of firms that provided goods to DOD shrunk between 1982 and 1987 from more than 118,000 to
less than 40,000.  For some products, it continued, there was no longer more than one domestic supplier.
Examples given included certain depth charge components, parachute recovery systems, some specialized marine
vessels, tanks, a number of types of machinery, nonmetallic pipe, and piezoelectric crystals.  The only domestic
source of certain materials for missiles had to be “bailed out” with federal funding according to James Blackwell,
project director for the CSIS study.59
In its annual assessment of the nation’s capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1991 reported further
dwindling of the manufacturing base.  Only one supplier remains for aircraft titanium extrusions, optic coatings,
and image converter tubes; and only two or three suppliers exist for sixteen other components.  Production
capability in essential sub-tier industries such as machine tools, gears, optics, bearings, castings, and forgings
has also declined.60  As a warning of the potential implications of such a dwindling domestic base, the JCS
wrote:  “The loss of sub-tier suppliers—manufacturers of subsystem components of larger systems—is a threat
to our ability to field state-of-the-art weapon systems on a timely basis.”61
Not stated but implied in the JCS warning is that dwindling manufacturing capabilities increases the
likelihood that foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities are perpetuated.  A hypothetical example by
Robert Kurtz illustrates the point.  Kurtz, chairman of a National Research Council study group commissioned
by the army to study US industrial preparedness in 1990, wrote:
Suppose, for example, that a modern Rosie [the Riveter] was asked to design a microchip for an
aircraft guidance system.  She might find it difficult, if not impossible, to locate a domestic company
with the equipment to convert her design into an actual product. .!.!. Many companies lack the
sophisticated machinery needed to produce modern weapons.62
While US firms may have the “technological know-how,” the Japanese “have the mass production and
quality control capability” with respect to electronics and semiconductors.63  Today US firms are often left with
little choice but to procure components from overseas sources, rather than invest huge sums of money and many
years of research and development to achieve the capabilities that other nation’s firms already have.  Foreign
components are typically inexpensive and of high quality, a combination that offers strong incentives to buy
abroad.
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A 1988 DOD report expounds upon further consequences of a particularly disconcerting trend, the decline of
the machine tool industry:
The decline of manufacturing equipment industries is of particular concern to the Department of
Defense.  As long as state-of-the-art production equipment is manufactured in the United States, there is
a substantial capability to reconstitute or expand American product industries.  However, without the
basic tools for manufacturing, this capability virtually disappears, leaving United States security
vulnerable to the political and economic processes of other nations.64
If the United States not only procures critical components from other nations, but also cannot produce the
components even if it wanted to, it is certainly more susceptible to foreign pressure than if it had prospective
domestic suppliers.  A dwindling manufacturing base therefore increases the likelihood that US vulnerabilities
will multiply in the long term.  Clearly any successful plan to reduce the vulnerabilities created by foreign
procurement requires a long-range, dual approach—focusing upon improvements to US manufacturing
capabilities, as well as mitigation of existing vulnerabilities.
The third and final factor that compounds vulnerability is inconsistency within the US government.  The
industrial base that supplies components to DOD is not an entity separate from the commercial industrial base;
indeed, the distinction between military and commercial technologies is steadily diminishing.  DOD will
therefore not be able to reduce long-term vulnerabilities created by diminished manufacturing without the joint
efforts of numerous other federal government agencies and private firms.  Unfortunately, the current lack of
coordinated efforts, as well as disjointed policies within the US government inhibit the identification of long-
term solutions.
The term “defense industrial base” is, in many respects, a misnomer.  It implies that there is an industry
supplying only DOD completely separate from the commercial realm.  The fact is, however, that while there are
firms for which DOD is the only or biggest customer, there are also many that supply to DOD as one of
numerous customers.  According to an industrial base study by the General Accounting Office, DOD’s
suppliers:
“.!.!.!manufacture both defense and non-defense products.  Activities of the firms range from
assembling major weapon systems (such as tanks and missiles) to supplying small parts (such as
washers, screws, and clamps), to machining already manufactured parts.”65  Congress’ Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) agrees:  “DOD is a small and relatively insignificant customer when
compared to aggregate consumer demand in most high technology, civilian-based industries.”66
Department of Commerce official John A. Richards further expounded during 1988 testimony before
Congress:  “Defense production of most firms within the industrial base comprises less than 10 percent of their
business.  In order to maintain their ability to continue to produce defense items, most companies must be able
to compete in the commercial sector which accounts for the overwhelming majority of orders.”  He further
testified that the Department of Commerce and DOD had cooperated previously to make a list of sixty industries
critical to national security.  The process of making such a list, however, became extremely difficult because
“only a handful of industries .!.!. don’t have a role” in supporting or supplying DOD.  “Our industrial base is
not a separate defense industrial base and non-defense industrial base,” was Mr. Richard’s conclusion.67
The lack of distinction between military and commercial industries is also applicable to technologies.  The
task of separating technologies that are uniquely military and civilian, in fact, is extremely difficult.  “What the
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military calls brilliant guidance is a subspecies of precision navigation, and precision navigation technologies
are used in commercial products,” according to the OTA.68  There are “food chain linkages,”69 meaning that few
technologies are developed in isolation.  Brilliant guidance, for instance, feeds upon computers, sophisticated
microchips, sensors, mapping systems, and inertial guidance technologies.  Furthermore, recent listings of
critical commercial technologies by the independent Council on Competitiveness as well as the White House
Critical Technologies Panel of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, included many items that were on
DOD’s critical technologies list.70  Critical technologies in the United States thus have a “dual use” nature,
applicable to both military security and commercial prosperity.
These inexorable linkages—between military and commercial technologies, as well as between military and
commercial industries—mean that DOD, by itself, is incapable of preventing growing vulnerabilities caused by
the dwindling of US industry.  Only a coordinated and joint effort between DOD, other government agencies,
and commercial industry can do the job.  Unfortunately, the current lack of a coordinated effort precludes making
progress in reducing vulnerability.
Absent within the US government are “institutions capable of dealing with complex technological [or
industrial] issues that have both commercial and military implications and that cut across several industries.”71
Twenty six government agencies are responsible for industrial preparedness planning, but there is no real
“champion” within for industrial matters.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates
preparedness planning for natural and man-made disasters (war), but it has neither the resources, nor the authority
to be effective in this mission—it can convene meetings but not compel attendance, force decisions, or enforce
recommendations.72
With respect to technology, “the one organization that provides an overview of federal research and other
activities related to economic performance, is the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP),” according to retired Admiral B. R. Inman and Daniel F. Burton Jr., active participants in various
councils that propose recommendations for revitalizing industrial competitiveness.  OSTP helps to coordinate
federal research and development (R&D), but like FEMA, it has no line functions, and operates on a small
budget and staff on loan from other agencies.  Civilian R&D is dispersed among twelve agencies in the
executive branch and thirteen appropriations subcommittees for science in the legislative branch.  In a manner
analogous to civilian R&D, military R&D is dispersed among the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and numerous service laboratories.  And while DARPA is one of the most highly respected research
agencies within the US government, it has little coordination with civilian agencies, although half of its budget
is invested in dual-use technologies.  In effect, there are many agencies responsible for fostering technology
within the US government, each going off in its own direction with R&D or policies that affect other agencies,
and there is no mechanism for establishing reasonable compromises or setting priorities.73
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The lack of coordination that exists between government agencies also exists between government and
industry.  DOD’s relationship with its subcontractor base is an example.  The Pentagon fails to “encourage
vendor’s participation in strategic planning decisions or design processes,” despite the fact that “purchased
materials and components supplied by subcontractors represent 50 to 85 percent of the total cost.”  Instead,
requirements for “free and open price competition,” combined with program stretch outs, and uncertain defense
budgets “have the effect of keeping the supplier base in constant turmoil and make it virtually impossible .!.!.
to build a stable base of reliable, high quality, cost-effective vendors.”74
Further hampering a coordinated effort in reducing long-term vulnerabilities is a variety of inconsistent
policies.  Policies affecting the industrial and technology base, as well as procurement from overseas sources
have been developed in a case-by-case approach, with no real priorities or strategy applied.75  Certain existing
policies, in fact, were demonstrated by DOD researcher Roderick Vawter to be responsible for the pervasive
nature of foreign procurement.  Procurement officers, he wrote in 1986, have long been attuned to the necessity
of having a prosperous domestic industrial and technology base to ensure delivery of needed components on a
timely basis, especially in emergency situations.  These same procurement officers, however, have been
confronted with competition and NATO standardization policies, which opened up bidding for defense contracts
to other nations.  In many cases, foreign firms outbid US firms, and thus contracts were awarded overseas, to the
detriment of the domestic industrial base.76
There are also policy conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of government in the area of
foreign procurement.  Approximately twenty-three congressional-mandated “buy American” provisions exist in
current statutes.77  DOD complies with each of these laws, but waiver authority granted within certain of these
laws still permits foreign procurement.  To comply with the broad “Buy American Act of 1933” for instance,
DOD adds 50 percent to the price bid by overseas firms, thus fostering advantage for domestic bidders.  At the
same time, however, for most contract awards, DOD waivers this act in support of reciprocity arrangements in
defense procurement established by nineteen memoranda of understanding with US allies.78
Other existing government laws and policies discourage production or make it noncompetitive to produce in
the United States.  An incomplete listing includes:
• Some rocket motor chemicals for example, can’t be produced within the United States because of
environmental regulations.79
• US Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) standards, while important in providing a safe
work environment, have nevertheless increased costs of production and ultimately the price of products.
• Anti-trust restrictions within the United States have discouraged cooperative ventures between
companies, though such ventures have been successful in fostering industry in other nations.
• Military specifications (MILSPECs) for product content and performance are overstated in the
minds of many manufacturers—in the PGM study, suppliers responding to a survey felt MILSPEC
increase costs and may even result in lower quality than is available commercially.80
• Product liability laws necessitate extensive tests and evaluation to protect manufacturers against
costly lawsuits in the United States.
• Current US tax policies provide a lack of incentive for investment in new equipment, plants, and
technology.
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The above are all “nonproductive costs" that increase the price of US products and create burdens on US
manufacturers often not encountered by foreign suppliers.  Combined, these laws and policies constitute a “de
facto industrial policy,” that is “at best, incoherent and, at worst, counterproductive.”81
The term “industrial policy” conjures intense debate within the United States.  While some defense analysts
such as Robert Costello and Jacques Gansler claim such policy already exists,82 officially there is none.
Generally taken to mean that the government provides incentives to enhance strategically-chosen industries—in
effect, picking winners and losers—industrial policy is something that advocates of free market economics argue
the government is ill-prepared to do.  According to free market advocates, the government should interfere with
the market and industry as little as possible and only when absolutely necessary.  They believe market forces
will distribute the right mix of resources both in the United States and around the world.  Proponents offer the
sustained prosperity of the United States since World War II as evidence of the success of free markets.  Free
market advocates currently occupy most key policy-making positions within the executive branch of the US
government.
Unfortunately, continuing allegiance by the United States to free market ideology may be illogical in
today’s world.83  Other countries, especially Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asian nations such as Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore, and also some European nations including Germany, have forged ahead economically
without fostering free markets.  Most of these nations, America’s biggest economic competitors, have no
qualms about picking winners and losers.  Naohiro Amaya, former Japanese vice minister for international
affairs in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), explained Japan’s philosophy:  “When you go
hunting, you have to shoot at a target.!.!.!. But your neoclassical school of economics says you can fire in all
directions at once and the ‘market’ will ensure you hit the target.  Well, we don’t accept that line of
reasoning!.!.!.”84
Strategic industries in these nations are frequently subsidized by the government in both labor and
development costs.  Unlike the United States, responsibility for industrial and technology policies are centralized
(rather than separated) into a ministry of science and technology or trade and industry.85  In each of these
countries placing broad responsibilities in one agency has fostered coordinated, consistent, and successful efforts
to make their industries competitive in world markets.  Evidence of their successes are everywhere as they have
gained huge market shares of industries once dominated by the United States:  semiconductors, machine tools,
gears, optics, bearings, castings, forgings, etc.  These are precisely the industries where concern exists about the
vulnerability introduced by foreign procurement of components for US military weapons systems.
By clinging to simple-minded free market ideology and allowing uncoordinated agencies and inconsistent
policies to prevail, the US government has fostered industrial losers rather than enhancing strategic winners.  As
argued in the CSIS report, plans to let the market “play itself out” could foster further dwindling of the
industrial base as the economy shifts toward a service economy.  “Without government intervention, the defense
market will not produce the right mix of material needed for national security.  For this reason, the government
cannot simply take a complete hands-off approach.”86  In testimony before a House subcommittee in 1989,
Anthony H. Harrigan, President, US Business and Industrial Council, added “.!.!.!the market doesn’t have any
appreciation of strategic factors.  A company has no requirement to consider the national interest in its
production; it has to, especially today in terms of profit calculations on the short term, look only at the bottom
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line.”87  As the dwindling of our nation’s critical industries has shown, the bottom line all too often has been
oblivious to the vulnerabilities created by foreign procurement.
Policy Recommendations
What policy direction should the United States take to respond to the current trends and implications of foreign
procurement?  Many of the trends and implications described in this paper are negative from a US perspective.
Foreign procurement potentially renders the United States vulnerable to exploitation by other governments, and
this vulnerability is compounded by lack of knowledge about its extent, the dwindling manufacturing base,
uncoordinated agencies, inconsistent policies, and the strategic indifference of a free market economy.  Due to
these negative implications, policy makers within DOD and the US government cannot allow foreign
procurement to proceed unmitigated.  One policy option to combat these negative effects would simply be to
prohibit foreign procurement (or at least limit it to the maximum extent practical).88  But such policy would be
ignorant of an essential benefit of foreign procurement.
Although a policy prohibiting foreign procurement would eliminate the vulnerabilities created by supply
cutoff or delay in delivery from overseas suppliers, such a policy would also eliminate US access to the world’s
best technologies.  As demonstrated previously, technologically superior weapons are an essential element of
US military strategy—they enable precise, overwhelming, quick, and effective offensive action, while at the
same time minimizing US and noncombatant casualties.  To the degree that restrictions on foreign procurement
hinder US strategy, such constraints are undesirable policy choices.  Restricting DOD contractor procurement of
the highest quality, most advanced semiconductors, for instance, hinders the strategic pursuit of precise and
effective military capabilities by the United States.  In effect, restricting foreign procurement is a self-inflicted
vulnerability, potentially rendering the United States incapable of fielding improved and “break-through”
weapons that potential adversaries might themselves procure.
For this reason alone, it is essential to consider balanced policy options.  Instead of substituting one
vulnerability for another, policy makers should focus on reducing or eliminating the vulnerabilities that
currently exist and conditions that compound and increase the likelihood of their perpetuation.  An optimal
policy needs to contain several elements.
On one hand, the United States must obtain greater knowledge about the true extent of the foreign
components within DOD weapon systems.  The information contained within the DINET database must be
expanded.  Until DINET reaches, “all the way to the end of the supplier and subcontractor chain, the foreign
dependencies involved for critical weapon systems and components .!.!. the nation is planning in the dark.”89
A complete database would enable specific analysis and determination of the foreign components that create the
greatest vulnerabilities.  An annual survey of every supplier in the numerous tiers of the subcontractor network
should be undertaken to obtain the needed information missing from the database.
To enable specific determination of vulnerabilities, the database should allow analysts to answer three
questions.  First, what components supplied by foreign producers are common to multiple weapon systems?
Cutoff or delay of components that are widely used have potentially greater impact on US force capabilities than
those unique to one weapon system.  Second, at what point does each overseas supplied component become
essential for non-interrupted production of the weapon system—in other words, become part of the “critical
path?”  If US contractors could continue producing a weapon system without a specific overseas component for
an extended time until other sources of supply are established, then the impact of cutoff or delay would be
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minimal.  On the other hand, the impact of a cutoff could reach crisis proportions if the sudden unavailability of
a particular foreign component quickly implied a production work stoppage.
Third, and finally, for each particular foreign component, are the suppliers members of a “concentrated”
industry?  Theodore Moran, Director of the Program in International Business Diplomacy at the School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University, has demonstrated that the threat of foreign manipulation of the United
States is greatest when “there is a concentration within a very few nations of external suppliers of technology,
products, or inputs.”  He advocates determining the risk of foreign manipulation by adopting a standard, the
“4/50 rule of thumb which has proven useful in economic and anti-trust policy.”  The proposed rule suggests
“that when there are more than four foreign companies or four foreign nations supplying more than 50 percent
of the world market, they will lack the ability to collude effectively even if they wish to exploit or manipulate
recipients.”90
How costly would building and analyzing such an extensive database be?  One DOD source in 1988
estimated it would take $29 million over five years to accomplish what is needed.  Offering a trade-off as
comparison, the source equated the cost of the database with that of one F-16.  Given limited budgetary
resources, and the fact that most decision makers can more readily comprehend the deterrent value of an F-16
over that of a database, this source felt that the database would likely receive inadequate funding.91  The source
was correct—a mere $2 million was allocated to the database through 1990.92  The lack of comprehension
concerning the (deterrent) value of a database is unfortunate, however.  Obtaining comprehensive data is the first
step in pro-actively combating unintended disruptions of supply and in deterring other governments from
exploiting vulnerabilities created by US foreign procurement.
Remedial action is the second necessary step to deter exploitation.  Two remedies—establishment of
stockpiles and proliferation of suppliers—could offer speedy and proactive deterrence.  Long-term deterrence,
however, requires enhancement of the US manufacturing base.
One short-term remedy is world-wide proliferation of suppliers.  If the analysis made possible by an
enhanced database reveals that particular foreign suppliers are part of a non-concentrated industry, then it would
be logical for DOD to request its primary contractors to disperse subcontracts among several suppliers for each
foreign component.  In this manner, DOD would decrease the likelihood that one or even several foreign
suppliers could totally disrupt continued US production of a weapon system.
Though supplier proliferation decreases vulnerability, it is not foolproof.  Suppliers might not be
concentrated with respect to market share or nation, as Moran’s description implies, but instead might be
concentrated within a particular geographical region of the world.  For example, most of the world’s
semiconductor producers are located in the Far East, making all of them more susceptible to hostile action by
another nation than if they were dispersed over several geographical regions.  Neither does supplier proliferation
ensure that remaining suppliers have the capacity for producing the needed quantity of a particular component if
the United States is cut off by one nation.  While proliferation of suppliers offers much greater protection from
vulnerability than unmitigated, uncoordinated, and unknowing foreign procurement, a second
remedy—stockpiles—is also desirable.
The second, admittedly a short-term remedy, is more foolproof.  By knowing which components procured
from foreign sources are common to several weapon systems or are on the critical path of an especially
important system, DOD can require its domestic contractors to stockpile quantities of those foreign components
sufficient to enable uninterrupted production until an alternate supply is established.  Cutoff or delay in delivery
would then have little impact on the continued production of important weapon systems in the short term.
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Researchers of the PGM study cited earlier found that a stockpile consisting of approximately twenty items
and costing approximately $15 million would ensure uninterrupted production of the seventeen critical missiles
studied “even if all overseas sources were cutoff.”  These researchers were amazed that such a relatively small
investment would preclude successful exploitation of vulnerability for an entire class of weapons.93
Unfortunately, however, this option has been neglected.  Since the 1987 PGM study, in fact, no funding has
been allocated for PGM component stockpiles.  DOD should immediately discontinue this neglect.  As PGMs,
so-called “smart bombs,” were proven to be essential and successful performers in the Gulf War; funding for
component stockpiles of these weapons would be an especially worthwhile and cheap insurance policy.
Beyond stockpiles for PGM components, however, DOD should establish greater funding priority to deter
exploitation of vulnerabilities that impact other weapon systems.  Establishment of specific stockpiles and/or
supplier proliferation policies should be based upon conclusions drawn from extended data collection and
analysis, as called for above.  Even if the combined costs for such activities approaches $1 billion, the total
would be merely three-tenths of one percent of the $291 billion defense budget in Fiscal Year 1992 .  Certainly
a proportion of the defense budget this small is a worthwhile investment, given its deterrent value.
Deterring exploitation of vulnerabilities through stockpiling and proliferating suppliers, however, does not
remedy conditions within the United States that perpetuate the growing dependence on foreign suppliers.
Additional measures are required to reverse the nation’s dwindling manufacturing base.  Such measures are of
special importance, because a strong manufacturing base is an important determinant of the nation’s ability to
produce and sustain a strong military force.
Strategic industrial planning by the US government is an essential function.  No longer should survival of
US industries critical to defense (or economic prosperity) be left to the strategic indifference of a free market.
No longer should an inconsistent set of government policies, regulations, and laws hinder the efficiency of US
industry.
A high priority task within the government should be to conduct an extensive review of policies,
regulations, and laws that impact the industrial base.  Each must be judged on its overall enhancement of the
industrial base.  Those regulations, policies, and laws that achieve merely a narrow purpose while hampering a
great portion of the industrial base, should be discarded, reversed, or revised.94  While successful for many years
in preventing monopolistic practices within US industry, anti-trust laws are now hindering the cooperative
ventures proven successful by overseas industries.  Current anti-trust laws are thus important candidates for
revision.  Similar candidates are US tax laws, especially the capital gains tax, as they hinder investment in new
manufacturing equipment.  A goal should be US policies, regulations, and laws that provide an incentive rather
than a burden to industry.95  Whenever possible, US policy should provide incentive for investment, as
investment is an important determinant of productivity.  Productivity enhances US industrial competitiveness,
and competitiveness is “a key to having healthy, leading-edge companies for DOD to buy from.”96
More than providing general incentives, however, the United States should target specific strategic
industries for enhancement.  Only strategic targeting will ensure availability of the “right mix” of industrial
capabilities necessary to preclude perpetuating foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities; free market
economics alone will not do this.  Identifying specific industrial targets for enhancement could be based, in part,
upon critical technology lists already established within DOD and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy.  As mentioned previously, these lists are similar, though there are some differences.  These
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separate lists should be reconciled and merged into a set of joint national industrial technology priorities.  The
existing critical lists also currently lack companion plans demonstrating how “available resources .!.!. will be
applied to reach the identified milestones and objectives.”97  Lead agencies should be identified within the
government to monitor and nurture each technology, and monetary assistance should be provided as needed.
Moran’s “4/50 rule of thumb” used in conjunction with an enhanced data base would further enable
identification and prioritization of strategic US industries.  Using Moran’s scheme, dwindling US industries in
areas where “the sources of external supply are concentrated” should be of greatest concern for US policy makers
due to the potential for foreign manipulation.  These industries should be assigned high priority for US
government assistance and protection for national security.98
Enhancing US industry in order to prevent the perpetuation of foreign procurement vulnerabilities requires
government subsidies.  While the term “subsidy” generally has negative connotations, money granted to a
strategic industry by the government is, in effect, an investment.99  Subsidies, like private investments, provide
the capital to ensure that the technologies and industry the United States needs will remain productive and
competitive in the future.  The government doesn’t need to fund full costs, but it could establish cooperative
funding ventures with private industry for those projects it deems strategic.  Already, government and industry
have cooperatively combined to develop better manufacturing capabilities and techniques through DOD’s
Manufacturing Technology Program.  Another apparently successful venture is Sematech, combining monetary
resources from DOD with a consortium of fourteen private firms to enhance semiconductor production
techniques.  These consortia should be models for other cooperative ventures between government and strategic
industries.
Foreign procurement could also be incorporated within strategic planning to enhance the manufacturing
base.  Rather than depending upon “direct product purchases” from overseas firms, DOD contractors should
attempt to license foreign technologies and to procure “industrial techniques” (management practices) through
“consulting and service contracts” with foreign firms,100 then produce needed components within the United
States.  In this manner, the United States would maintain access to the components and technologies it needs for
its weapon systems, but at the same time take steps towards reducing the conditions that foster long-term
vulnerabilities.  In the long term, such practices might even foster greater quality, price, and technology
competitiveness within US industry.  Licensing technologies and buying industrial techniques are more
expensive than buying only components, but the additional long-term benefits may be worth the costs.  Foreign
procurement would therefore serve a strategic purpose beyond complementing military strategy.
Ultimately, however, unprecedented coordination in planning and policy between DOD, civilian government
agencies, and commercial firms is necessary to enhance US manufacturing.  Several arguments presented earlier
in this essay depicted the necessity for unity.  For one, DOD cannot effectively enhance the manufacturing base
on its own since most US suppliers overwhelmingly depend on commercial contracts for their livelihood.  At
the same time it is unable to render effective unilateral support, DOD hampers its subcontractor suppliers by
failing to include them in its strategic planning.  Further hindering effective assistance to the manufacturing
base is the lack of a single agency within the government capable of resolving the numerous issues that affect
government and industry.
An effective agency within the US government that could “champion” and coordinate industrial affairs
would be extremely helpful in reversing the dwindling manufacturing base in the United States.  Consisting of
representatives from several government agencies as well as liaisons from outside the government, the proposed
agency must be inspired by the military concept of “jointness.”  Jointness is simply the unification of several
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distinct organizations with a common objective under the leadership of a single powerful individual who has
authority to approve fiscally-constrained plans and policy.  Application of this concept has been credited with
enabling the US military to efficiently and successfully prosecute the war against Iraq.101
A specific organizational model for such a joint agency might be an improved version of the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).  CFIUS consists of eight cabinet-level officials:  the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, the Assistant to the
President for Economic Affairs, Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, the
Attorney General, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.  This committee investigates the
national security implications of foreign acquisitions of US firms that supply defense materials, then
recommends whether presidential approval of each transaction is warranted.102  Since this committee already
analyzes industrial matters with national security implications, it would be a logical candidate for an expanded
mission—setting the direction and resolving the issues that could improve the adequacy of the overall US
industrial base from both a civilian and military perspective.
Several changes to the committee’s existing structure, however, would enhance its “jointness” and its
capability to successfully reverse the dwindling industrial base.  First, its membership must be expanded.  Added
to its membership should be the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy, as well as
liaisons from industry and the scientific community to ensure key players are not left out of strategic planning.
Congressional representatives should also be included for the initial sessions in order to gain consensus between
the executive and legislative branches.103
Second, the committee should have a permanent support staff—CFIUS currently has none—that would
provide detailed policy analysis to the committee’s members.  Each agency composing the committee would
assign personnel to the support staff.  These staff members should have knowledge of industrial matters
affecting the agencies they represent as well as a “joint perspective”—an attitude that enables them to work
together toward a common objective.
Finally, to enforce a joint perspective, the committee should be headed by an individual with clear
presidential authority for establishing a broad policy designed to improve the industrial base.  Since the top
individuals serving on the committee are of cabinet rank, a logical choice for leadership would be the Vice
President of the United States.  A leader with such broad responsibility would enable the committee to look
beyond the focused or tunneled concerns of individual agencies and instead examine proposals and develop policy
for achieving the desired common objective.
A single, joint agency structured in this manner would have greater potential for reversing the decline of the
manufacturing base than the current uncoordinated approach.  By virtue of its cross-cutting membership, it can
develop wide-ranging policies for assisting industry, something that neither DOD nor any other government
agency can do alone.  Some of the turmoil that currently hampers domestic suppliers would be reduced by
including industry liaisons in strategic planning.  And by virtue of the clear and broad presidential authority of
the committee’s proposed leader, the entire government would be more responsive to the coordinated policies
developed.
Conclusions
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The policy implications of procuring foreign components for use in US military weapon systems are
multifaceted.  The United States can reap several benefits from procuring components overseas, and one—access
to the world’s best technologies for incorporation into technically superior weapon systems—is an essential
component of US military strategy.  For strategic military reasons then, policy makers should not limit
procurement to domestic sources.
Instead, policy making should focus upon taking advantage of this essential benefit while at the same time
working to mitigate factors that make the United States vulnerable to delay in delivery, complete cutoff, or
foreign manipulation.  To preclude “planning in the dark,” the United States must gain greater knowledge of the
true extent to which foreign components are used in its weapon systems.  An expanded database containing
information about components procured at all levels of the supplier network is essential in determining where
vulnerability risks are greatest.  Risks, once identified, can be mitigated by proliferating suppliers and
establishing stockpiles of critical components.
To minimize the long-term likelihood that foreign procurement and the vulnerabilities associated with it
might someday become unmanageable, policy must also focus upon the task of reversing the decline of the US
industrial base.  Future US military capabilities are dependent on competitive domestic industries that produce
the components DOD needs for its weapon systems.  Inconsistent US government policies, uncoordinated
agencies, and the strategic indifference of a free market economy currently hinder competitiveness in many
industries.  To combat these hindrances, the US government needs to engage in strategic industrial planning.
This planning should include revision of existing policies that negatively impact industry.  In addition, strategic
industries should be identified, and government funds should be used for investment in enhanced US productivity
in critical US industries.
A viable plan for enhancing the US industrial base and mitigating the vulnerabilities represented by foreign
procurement requires more than just DOD.  It requires “jointness”—close cooperation and coordination between
government and industry.  A single, joint organization including representatives from key executive branch
agencies, along with liaisons from Congress and the commercial manufacturing sector, could be an effective
mechanism for setting industrial priorities and establishing reasonable compromises currently not achievable
within the US government.  Under the leadership of an individual with clear and broad presidential authority, the
committee would give policy concerning industrial affairs and future foreign procurement a clear focus.  In this
manner, US policy would become more responsive to the trends and needs demonstrated by the current pervasive
procurement of foreign components for US weapon systems.
Appendix
A review of the existing literature and studies reveals numerous examples of foreign components in US weapons
systems.  A sampling follows:
Jacques S. Gansler, Affording Defense (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1989).
• The US defense industry is now heavily, if not totally, dependent on foreign sources for computer
memory chips, silicon for high-powered electronic switching, gallium arsenide-based semiconductors
for high-speed data processing, precision glass for reconnaissance satellites and other military
equipment, liquid crystal and luminous displays, and advanced fiber optics (p. 271).
• In 1985 the Congressional Defense Joint Oversight Committee on Foreign Dependency looked
into the navy’s Sparrow III air-to-air missile and found that the guidance system contained integrated
circuits and transistors from Japan, a ferrite phase shifter from West Germany, a memory chip
assembled in Thailand, and ball bearings made of raw materials from ‘various’ sources.  In all, sixteen
foreign-produced parts were identified (p. 271).
Tim Carrington, “Vital Parts:  Military’s Dependence on Foreign Suppliers Causes Rising Concern,” The Wall
Street Journal, 24 March 1988, pp. 1, 17.
• Ball bearings in US submarines, aircraft, and tanks come increasingly from Europe and Asia.
Some navy ships ride at anchor on Spanish chains (p. 1).
• Gallium arsenide (important because it uses less power and is faster than silicon) is procured from
Japan for use in precision guidance systems for missiles and smart bombs, radar apparatus,
communications equipment, and electronic countermeasure systems.  It is also critical for any space-
based anti-missile system (p. 17).
• Extremely powerful magnets used in satellite components also come from Japan.  Future sources
for these magnets also include Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany (p. 17).
• The Bradley Fighting Vehicle contains imported sophisticated sensors to inform the crew of
potential threats and targets (p. 17).
Martin C. Libicki, Industrial Strength Defense:  A Disquisition on Manufacturing, Surge, and War (Washington
D.C.:  National Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, 1988).
• Up to half of the components in test equipment modules come from overseas.  Test equipment is
essential in producing weapons, because they must work right the first time (p. 60).
Martin Libicki, Jack Nunn, and Bill Taylor, US Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerability, Phase II-Analysis
(Washington D.C.:  National Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, November 1987).
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